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Abstract
Free population movement promises greater human lib-
erties and improved economic performance . Inevitably, 
however, there are critics . Most vocally, the conservative 
Right points towards the erosion of Western welfare sys-
tems, the large migratory movements that a No Borders 
policy may precipitate, and the lowering of living stan-
dards in rich countries to approximate those in poor coun-
tries . This paper argues that, although the claims of the 
Right are often exaggerated, these objections have served 
to paste over important differences between advocates of 
No Borders, producing some unlikely bedfellows in oppos-
ition to conservative arguments . In particular, an uncom-
fortable conflation between liberal and Left-wing ideology 
has emerged as a result of the specific discursive strategy 
of Right-wing commentators to obfuscate distinctions 
between these ideological stances . After outlining the argu-
ments of the Right for context, this paper responds to this 
conflation by distancing a Left-wing No Borders position 
from a free-market liberal No Borders position . It does 
this by using Left-wing arguments to criticize liberal No 
Borders ideology, and concludes by suggesting some key 
features of a Left-wing No Borders position .
Résumé
La liberté de mouvement des populations promet un 
accroissement des libertés publiques et une amélioration 
des performances économiques . Inévitablement, des cri-
tiques se font entendre . L’un des plus bruyants, la droite 
conservatrice, craint l’érosion des mécanismes de pro-
tection sociale mis en place dans les sociétés occidentales, 
les grands mouvements migratoires qu’une politique No 
Border pourrait précipiter et le rabaissement du niveau de 
vie dans les pays nantis vers celui des pays pauvres . Bien 
que les affirmations de la droite soient souvent exagérées, 
le présent article soutient qu’en servant à masquer d’im-
portantes différences entre les partisans No Border, ces 
objections ont suscité d’étranges oppositions aux argu-
ments conservateurs . Un assemblage particulièrement 
inconfortable entre l’idéologie libérale et gauchiste est 
apparu à cause de la façon dont les commentateurs de 
droite brouillent les distinctions entre ces positions idéo-
logiques . Après une mise en contexte rappelant les argu-
ments de la droite, l’auteur répond à cet enchevêtrement en 
distinguant la position No Border de la gauche de celle du 
libéralisme économique . L’auteur se sert des arguments de 
la gauche pour critiquer l’idéologie libérale No Border et 
suggère, en conclusion, quelques tactiques susceptibles de 
rehausser la position No Border gauchiste .
Introduction
This paper examines three positions on the No Borders 
debate . First, it reviews the arguments of what are called here 
“Right-wing Conservatives .” These commentators are gener-
ally suspicious of migration, often on the basis of arguments 
about resource depletion in terms of jobs, welfare benefits, 
and space, or alternatively on the basis of “national identity” 
being undermined . These commentators are, of course, not 
a homogeneous group and the views I present in what fol-
lows are necessarily somewhat general . The second position 
on No Borders is in disagreement with the first on the basis 
that the economic gains available through increased migra-
tion outweigh the costs and are often underestimated . This 
school typically draws upon notions of economic efficiency 
to demonstrate their case: borders are an impediment to the 
functioning of a free market, so their arguments go, and so 
we can label this school “liberal .” Again, liberal commenta-
tors are in reality a diverse group, so a caveat that the char-
acterization of this group is a generalization is necessary . 
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Notwithstanding this caveat, this school would argue that 
various parties gain from migration, including migrants 
themselves, sending countries, and receiving countries . 
Because the liberal school is often in conversation with the 
conservative Right, however, the gains to receiving com-
munities are frequently foregrounded, since the conserva-
tive Right is most interested in the fortunes of this group . 
A third position is that of Left-wing commentators . A Left-
wing ideology does not immediately produce a position for 
or against No Borders . Capitalism is served by the immobil-
ity of the working class, but could just as well be served by 
its mobility . There are therefore some Left-wing advocates 
who would argue against a No Borders position on the basis 
that borders protect would-be migrants from competition 
with each other . In the spirit of this special issue, however, 
I set out to outline the features of a Left-wing No Borders 
position, in relation to and in distinction from a liberal No 
Borders position . Again, the complexity of the Left means 
that this aspiration is bound to generalize, and it is for this 
reason that I offer no more than what I will call “suggestions” 
about what that position would look like in the conclusion 
of the essay .
This project of defining what a Left-wing No Borders 
position would look like has become necessary because the 
conservative Right tends to conflate Left-wing and liberal 
positions, which can cause confusion on the Left . Indeed, it 
is clear that some elements of the conservative Right set out 
to achieve such a conflation . Clarifying points of difference 
between a Left-wing approach and a liberal approach, then, 
can be seen as an attempt to resist the strategic discursive 
strategies of the conservative Right that would disempower 
both the Left and the No Borders lobby by making it unclear 
how they relate to each other . The project is also attract-
ive from the point of view of its radical potential: the No 
Borders lobby is anti-capitalist, anti-statist, and anti-nation-
alist, and the Left could benefit by articulating its support 
of this movement in a way that is commensurate with its 
principles: this is the objective of this paper .
The first section will examine the way the conserva-
tive Right conflates liberal and Left-wing approaches . The 
second section addresses the arguments of the conservative 
Right directly, arguing that the range of reasons given by 
Right-wing commentators to be suspicious of migration are 
often exaggerated and ill-thought-through . In a similar vein, 
the third section goes on to outline some of the advantages—
ethical, economic, and political—that might be available 
through a No Borders position . The fourth section, how-
ever, begins with the observation that economic arguments 
in favour of migration in particular are very different from 
principled ethical or ideological stances . In particular, this 
section criticizes the liberal arguments that have been given 
in favour of more open borders . The way these arguments 
have been framed countenances an instrumental view of 
migrants and their labour, which is antithetical to an ethic-
ally and ideologically informed Left-wing approach . To be 
clear, it is therefore the intention of the paper to argue both 
against the arguments given for tighter borders by Right-
wing commentators, and against the largely economic argu-
ments given for looser borders by liberals . The concluding 
section outlines the characteristics of a third position, a 
Left-wing No Borders stance, that seeks to avoid the exag-
gerations and nationalism of the conservative Right but yet 
also seeks to avoid the market-based instrumentalism of the 
liberal school . The definition of a Left-wing No Borders pos-
ition is crucial if the Left is to support No Borders without 
being conflated with liberal arguments that would exploit, 
rather than protect, the international working class .
The Conflation of Liberal and Left-Wing Ideology 
by the Conservative Right
In this section I indicate how the conservative right has 
sought to conflate liberal and Left-wing positions in its 
characterization of debates about migration . This sets the 
scene for subsequent sections in which I argue against this 
conflation .
The No Borders campaign is striking fear into the hearts 
of conservatives . In alarmist tones, Hawkins and Anderson1 
recount the gathering organization and momentum of 
a political movement that they call the “Open Borders 
Lobby .”2 In the foreword to their book, Horowitz describes 
their impact as follows:
America’s borders have been under assault for forty years with 
consequences that are measurable and disturbing . The assault 
has been led by an Open Borders lobby that is sophisticated and 
powerful . Many of its components, moreover, have a history of 
antagonism to American purposes and a record of active support 
for America’s enemies . Its funders are multi-billion dollar entities, 
who are unaccountable and unscrutinized .3
From the perspective of British activists at least, the beliefs 
of Right-wing conservatives in the international organiza-
tion, influence, and coordination of the Open Borders lobby 
are both satisfying and risible . On the one hand, it is bracing 
to think that years of campaigning against false imprison-
ment, arbitrary and unlawful detention, and inhumane 
border control practices may be reaping dividends through 
the formulation of international activism against border 
control . On the other hand, however, it is abundantly clear 
that the alarmism of the Right is unwarranted and that the 
British No Borders movement at least remains dispersed, 
disaggregated, embryonic, out-numbered, underfunded, 
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and undersupported . The reality, as British radical activists 
and scholars know only too well, is that the image of No 
Borders as a coherent and organized international entity 
that commands billions of dollars in support of its lobbying 
activities is the stuff of conservative dystopian nightmares, 
and little more . The splintering, fracturing, and ideological 
disunity of the radical Left, and the ambiguity of its rela-
tionship to the No Borders lobby, rules out such cogency 
and influence .4
Two points emerge from the way in which conservatives 
discuss the No Borders campaign, however . First, a char-
acteristic of the way in which conservatives frame migra-
tion issues is their use of alarmist, extremist language . As 
Turton5 points out, the metaphors used by conservatives 
employ a range of linguistic devices, from metaphors of 
flooding, tidal waves, and dams, to a routine association of 
the figure of the migrant with terrorism, lying, and conta-
gious disease . Nowhere are these discursive strategies more 
apparent than in the Right-wing British printed press .6 As a 
measure of the effectiveness of these exaggerations, surveys 
indicate that the British public now overestimate the num-
ber of migrants and asylum seekers resident in the UK by 
approximately a factor of ten .7
A second notable conservative discursive strategy con-
cerns their conflation of liberalism and the Left . Returning 
to Horowitz’s dismayed account of the impact of the “Open 
Borders Lobby,” his association between the campaign for 
border liberalization and the Left, imagined as a coherent 
and well-funded international organization, is evident:
The concept of ‘Open Borders’ has long been an agenda of the 
ideological left . Since the 1960s, a vast network including hun-
dreds of organizations and tens of thousands of grassroots activ-
ists, backed by hundreds of millions of dollars from leftwing 
foundations, has waged a sustained campaign to open America’s 
borders to a mass migration from the Third World . Though these 
groups talk in terms of ‘human rights,’ the rights they demand 
are not the restrictions on government enshrined in the American 
Bill of Rights, but the claims on society for ‘equity’ and ‘welfare’ 
and special treatment for designated groups that are the familiar 
menu of the left and would, if enacted, amount to a revolution in 
America’s existing social order .8
While the ethical arguments for and against border lib-
eralization have received, and continue to receive, academic 
attention9 there is more work to be done in refuting the 
exaggerated and alarmist claims of conservatives who are 
concerned about the implications of No Borders, while the 
association between liberalism and the Left that Right-wing 
vocalism has produced also deserves closer attention . In par-
ticular, it is clear that the Left has a history of ambivalence 
towards more open borders: some on the Left see union-
hostile employers using loose border controls to generate 
wage depressive effects, and this complexity needs to be rec-
ognized . In order to address the conflation between liberal 
and Left-wing positions, it is helpful in the first instance to 
distance both of these from the claims of the conservative 
Right . The next section deals with these claims critically in 
order to distinguish the conservative Right position, which 
will make an analysis of the different ways in which liber-
als and Left-wing scholars differ from this position easier in 
subsequent sections .
A Critique of the Conservative Right Position 
against Free Migration
In this section I critically examine the claims of the conserv-
ative Right regarding the pitfalls of looser migration con-
trols both in order to critique these claims and in order to 
make the task of distinguishing the different ways in which 
liberals and those on the Left disagree with the Right-wing 
position easier in the final section and the Conclusion . One 
of the overriding concerns of conservative commentators 
when discussing the potential impacts of opening borders to 
migrants, or even the less extreme case of merely loosening 
migration controls, is the possibility that nation-states will 
cede their authority to non-state forces and relinquish their 
sovereignty in some way . These concerns, however, imply 
that states are generally successful in controlling their bor-
ders in the first instance . It is only on the assumption of a 
successful border control policy that waiving such control 
might be perceived as threatening . Yet numerous academic 
studies have drawn attention to the enduring inability 
of nation-states to control migration flows . Castles,10 for 
example, lists a range of high profile postwar migration pro-
grams that failed to deliver the reductions in migration flows 
that they promised, including Australia’s postwar migration 
program, Germany’s guest-worker recruitment plan of the 
1950s, 60s, and 70s, and recent European migration control 
initiatives which have merely succeeded in creating “profit-
able international business for people smugglers .”11 From an 
historical perspective, Amilhat-Szary12 draws attention to 
the long and complex history of Andean migrations in Latin 
America despite the long-term political and economic efforts 
of Spanish and Portuguese settlers to stem migration flows . 
More recently, Pipjers and Van der Velde13 draw attention 
to the ability of intelligent migrating agents to negotiate the 
legal requirements of border control policies in the context 
of Polish migrant workers in the Netherlands and Germany . 
They identify a range of micro-level strategies that allow 
individual migrants to circumvent blunt, national-level laws, 
constituting a set of creative and sophisticated techniques 
that allow migration in spite of border controls .
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The findings of these studies illustrate the difficulties of 
translating ideal policy stances into workable and effective 
migration policies . For Parker and Brassett,14 this difficulty 
relates to a deeper characteristic of Western thought that 
makes the heroic assumption that states are capable of pur-
suing whichever ethical or moral stance they select .15 Such 
a conflation of idealism and realism is, they argue, a charac-
teristic flaw in post-Enlightenment thought .16 In the context 
of migration control, there are intractable limitations upon 
effective border control management, including the diffi-
culty of distinguishing lying from truth-telling migrants, 
the expense of maintaining borders, especially in an era 
of bio-technological border innovations, and uncertainty 
over the ability of politicians to use the border controls at 
their disposal in a manner that serves the political interests 
of the country they claim to represent .17 Added to these dif-
ficulties are a host of constraints over Western democratic 
countries in particular that make the control of borders 
difficult to maintain . Western democracies rely upon inter-
national trade and tourism, making their borders perme-
able from the outset, and their long histories of migration 
render them subject to the momentum that this has cre-
ated, for example in terms of migrant networks .18 The fact 
that Western democracies tend to place a high value upon 
human rights also exposes individual states to humanitar-
ian pressure to adopt loose border controls .19 These struc-
tural factors, that perpetuate lasting differences between 
ideal and actual migration patterns, should indicate to 
concerned Western conservatives that the No Borders con-
cept represents far less of a threat than they might imagine, 
precisely because the controlled borders that they wish to 
defend have very rarely existed in practice . What has often 
been more effective in stemming the movement of people 
into restricted territories is the withholding of status and 
rights from newcomers once they are inside the territories 
in question .20 These mechanisms of exclusion would still 
operate when “borders” were removed . Although this line 
of argument does not address the broader and more con-
cerning issue of why people so frequently regard the loss of 
sovereignty as such a bad thing in the first place, if we begin 
from the premise that state sovereignty is to be defended, 
there are nevertheless reasons to expect that it would sur-
vive the loosening of borders .
Alongside a loss of sovereignty, another common con-
servative preoccupation when discussing open or loosened 
borders is the volume of migration that they are expected 
to precipitate . In response to a question posed by the BBC, 
“Should Borders Be Open?,” Sir Andrew Green, Chairman 
of the conservative British think-tank, MigrationWatch UK, 
responded with the following concerns:
Given the huge disparities of wealth, open borders would lead to 
massive flows of people from the third world to the industrial-
ized world until conditions there approximated to their home 
countries . This would be a recipe for chaos and would be entirely 
unacceptable to the inhabitants of the industrialized world .21
These comments belie two separate lines of argument . 
First is the notion that “massive” flows of people would take 
advantage of No Borders and second is the argument that liv-
ing conditions would equalize between rich and poor coun-
tries . In response to the first suggestion, numerous studies 
have indicated that large population movements would not 
result from border liberalization . Hayter,22 for example, dis-
cusses the case of the Caribbean, whose population was free 
to emigrate to former colonial powers and the United States 
between 1950 and 1980 . During this time, only 0 .6 per cent 
of the population emigrated per year, even though the region 
was experiencing high unemployment rates at that time . If 
these rates of emigration were reproduced worldwide under 
a No Borders framework, they might be expected to lead to 
a 2 .4 per cent annual increase in the populations of indus-
trialized countries . This is because most people prefer to 
stay in their country of origin if and when they can, since 
there are often economic, linguistic, and cultural barriers to 
integration abroad .23 The imposition of border controls may 
even, paradoxically, serve to limit the number of migrants 
who return to their countries of origin because when mobil-
ity is tightly regulated this tends to apply to movement both 
into and out of a country .24
These arguments have been recently illustrated through 
the experiences of Eastern European migrants following 
accession to the EU on 1 May 2004 . Conforming to a long 
history of concern about the degree to which No Borders 
might provoke migration at each stage of European expan-
sion,25 there were widespread concerns about the degree to 
which Eastern Europeans would attempt to enter the rest 
of Europe, prompting the majority of existing EU mem-
ber countries to delay the granting of free movement to 
Accession countries until after 2004 . France, Germany, Italy, 
and Spain, among others, imposed such delays . As one of 
the few countries that did not, Britain experienced a height-
ened flow of migrants after Accession, alongside Sweden and 
Ireland . In describing these effects, Gilpin et al .26 calculate 
that 300,000 Eastern Europeans registered for work in the 
year following European enlargement, representing roughly 
1 per cent of the UK labour market and between 1 .16 and 
0 .01 per cent of Accession countries’ populations . While this 
is certainly not insubstantial, it does not represent the tidal 
wave of migrant flows that some were expecting, in spite of 
the fact that some of the Accession countries had GDPs per 
capita of less than a tenth of the UK’s at this time . What is 
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more, even given the size of the flows of Eastern Europeans 
to the UK, Gilpin et al . argue that there was no discernible 
impact upon native employment prospects:
… overall, the economic impact of migration from the new EU 
Member States has been modest, but broadly positive, reflecting 
the flexibility and speed of adjustment of the UK labor market . 
Despite anecdotal evidence, there is no discernible statistical evi-
dence which supports the view that the inflow of A8 migrants is 
contributing to a rise in claimant unemployment in the UK .27
This finding needs to be qualified with the observation 
that it refers only to the claimant count; i .e ., those people 
officially recognized as seeking work . Less can be said about 
the unofficial unemployment rate, which might be affected 
by a contraction in informal and temporary work supply 
as a result of migration . Tellingly, market liberals and Left-
wing scholars may well be divided on this point, with the 
former less concerned about the impact of such a contrac-
tion on conditions of work in temporary and informal sec-
tors . Gilpin et al .’s findings therefore do need to be treated 
with caution, although their finding that official unemploy-
ment was not affected by the inflow of A8 migrants is still 
surprising and significant .
In response to the suggestion that living conditions 
would equalize between rich and poor countries under a 
No Borders framework, Sir Andrew is certainly not alone 
in expressing these concerns . Commentators as diverse 
as Carens,28 Miller,29 and Walzer30 have all drawn atten-
tion to the potential for No Borders to provoke migration 
that undermines welfare provision and living standards . 
As with previous arguments, however, these concerns are 
sometimes exaggerated31 . One common misunderstanding 
in conservative literatures is the routine underestimation of 
the importance of the plethora of economic, social, and pol-
itical mechanisms that maintain income inequality within 
receiving state jurisdictions, meaning that, even in the 
absence of effective migration controls, there are still a num-
ber of reasons to expect migrants to be unable to overcome 
inequality in receiving countries . Hanson,32 for example, 
outlines the differential geography of anti-migrant senti-
ments in the United States, which is driven by the degree 
to which an area has a low-income, low-skilled workforce . 
Such areas are more exposed to the income-reducing, com-
petitive effects of migration, so his argument goes, resulting 
in anti-migrant sentiment .
Various studies contest this income-reducing effect of 
migration . The Immigration Policy Centre’s Special Report, 
for example, noted that migrant workers tended to locate 
in different places to unemployed native workers, command 
different skills, and have experience of different occupations, 
meaning that they cannot be unproblematically “swapped” 
and are not, therefore, in direct competition .33 What emer-
ges as more important than the relation between unemploy-
ment and migration is the expectation of a relationship . 
As Cornelius and Rosenblum succinctly argue,34 “Even if 
the actual effects of immigration on receiving countries 
are typically modest, many citizens of migrant-receiving 
states perceive negative consequences—economic and non-
economic—that lead them to prefer more restrictive immi-
gration policies .”
Aside from this debate, what is striking about Hanson’s 
study is that those areas that do not have high concentra-
tions of low-skilled workers may be relatively pro-migration, 
because the costs of migration do not fall upon them and/or 
are not perceived to fall on them . Such privileged areas may 
be shielded from the effects of migration by house and land 
prices that exclude migrants, or by the educational capital 
that they command, allowing them to access labour markets 
that migrants cannot . They can consequently “afford” to be 
relatively pro-migration, secure in the knowledge that they 
will not face increased competition for homes or jobs should 
border controls be weakened . This illustrates the salience of 
mechanisms that produce socio-economic inequalities in 
recipient countries, which will favour the rich with or with-
out the presence of No Borders and should be a source of 
comfort to middle-class conservatives who are concerned 
about the erosive effects of freer population movement .
A fourth, oft-cited concern about No Borders involves the 
association between migration and the spreading of disease . 
Harper and Raman35 trace the association of disease and 
migration to the rise of bacteriology, pointing out the long 
history of border control predicated upon the containment 
of disease . Even when Britain, for example, was in other 
respects a notably liberal state in the late nineteenth century, 
the prerogative to exclude those suspected of carrying conta-
gious diseases, or “showing signs of madness,” was retained . 
Moreover, the policing of borders on the basis of disease 
containment often takes on a racialized character .36 The 
fear of migrants on a micro-bacterial basis has led to their 
increasing detention, incarceration, and quarantining . Such 
practices have been encouraged by sections of the conserva-
tive printed media who point out with incredulity both the 
bio-medical risks that migrants pose to native populations 
and, through these, the bio-security risks that they also rep-
resent .37 For developed, Western states which, according to 
some commentators, are strategically exposed to biological 
attacks, these associations are particularly alarming .38
Yet Harper and Raman39 also point out the contradic-
tion between a view of the figure of the migrant as a carrier 
of disease, and the image of migrants as potential health-
care providers who remain overrepresented as workers in 
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the public health systems of many developed countries . The 
continuing import of people with medical knowledge to 
Western democratic countries undermines the notion that 
Westerners have access to superior medical facilities and 
medical human capital . What is more, the relation between 
disease spreading and globalization may be non-linear: it 
is reasonable to expect that relatively small movements of 
people and objects across space are capable of carrying dis-
ease, and that subsequent movements beyond this level will 
have little additional negative impact . In other words, if the 
privileged are free to traverse the globe, and non-human 
objects such as birds, planes, and cattle are also internation-
ally mobile, then they are the ones who are culpable for dis-
ease spreading and, as long as they remain mobile, the fact 
that poorer people should also move, even in greater num-
bers, does not necessarily translate directly and proportion-
ally into greater risks .
Arguments in Favour of Freer Borders
In the face of the evident difficulties confronting the con-
servative objections to a No Borders world, there appear 
to be very few reasons to not move towards implementing 
looser border controls . This is all the more apparent in the 
light of the potential gains that No Borders advocates asso-
ciate with freer movement, which include, although are not 
limited to, the ethical, economic, and political advantages 
of No Borders .
From an ethical perspective, free movement has taken on 
the status of a right . Arguing against the notion that human 
rights are consistent across time and space, Smith40 proposes 
that human rights can be discovered, and that the body of 
human rights can legitimately adjust to the social environ-
ment . At a time of greater possibilities of mobility, freer and 
cheaper transportation, and greater supposed gains avail-
able through the ability to travel, the evolution of the stock 
of human rights to include human mobility is at once nat-
ural and ethical . From a different perspective, Scarpellino41 
adds to the claims of ethicalists in securing the human right 
of mobility by pointing to the human rights infringements 
that are necessary to enforce closed boundaries . Faced with 
strict border controls, there will always be some people who 
attempt to circumnavigate them . Investigating the increas-
ing death toll of would-be clandestine migrants at the 
Mexican-American border, which have risen in proportion 
to the militarization of the border, Scarpellino recounts the 
mobilization of an increasing array of forceful state pow-
ers . Similarly, Nevins,42 examining the relationship between 
migrant deaths at the US-Mexican border and international 
coffee markets, states that deaths of “illegal” migrants rose 
from “… 180 in the years 1993 and 1994 to an annual aver-
age of approximately 360 for fiscal years 2000 through 
2005 … Fiscal year 2005 had the highest number of fatalities 
on record: 463 .”43 The employment of military technologies 
to detect clandestine migrants, such as night-vision goggles, 
footfall detectors, and X- and gamma-ray scanners, alongside 
conventional weaponry, is commonplace and appears brutal 
and disproportionate next to the evident poverty and des-
peration of those who experience them . Other migrants take 
associated risks, such as travelling unlikely distances through 
deserts in intense heat and cold with inadequate provisions 
in order to avoid border controls . Similar risks are taken by 
people desperate to access Italy’s southern border from north-
ern Africa44 as well as a range of other European countries .45 
Faced with the loss of life and difficult conditions that these 
migrants experience, Scarpellino46 concludes that it is ethic-
ally indefensible to try to exclude them .
Alongside the ethical case for No Borders, academ-
ics have pointed to the economic advantages that human 
mobility precipitates .47 Orthodox Ricardian economics has 
established that, whether or not a particular country gains 
from migration, freer movement of factors of production, 
such as labour, is economically efficient for the world as a 
whole, especially when trading conditions are not perfect, 
such as in the case of perishable goods or protected inter-
national markets . Although the gains from migration are 
dependent upon the level of transport costs, freer movement 
allows regions to specialize in the production of particular 
goods and, abstracting from the increased risk and depend-
ence upon international markets that this implies, such 
specialization leads to overall increases in productivity .48 
Moreover, at a subnational scale, the gains from free move-
ment are evident in the unfettered growth, and decline, of 
cities as the natural spatial unit of late capitalism .49 While 
most humans on the planet live in urban environments, 
and economies are shaped around urban infrastructures, it 
seems bizarre, and is also economically counterproductive, 
to impose regulations upon movement at different, non-
urban scales such as the largely fictional national scale . A 
reduction in national border controls would allow cities to 
expand and contract in response to the counterposed forces 
of agglomeration and dispersion50 without being subject 
to external regulation, thereby achieving a more efficient 
match between migration supply and demand .
Further arguments can be made in favor of No Borders 
from a political perspective . The worldwide decline in 
interstate armed conflict over the past fifty years, charted 
by authors such as Marshall,51 O’Loughlin,52 and Kaldor53 
has been accompanied by increasingly large international 
movements of those displaced by violent conflict . Although 
conflict within countries, including civil war, has increased 
in number and intensity in recent years, the relationship 
between the mobility of those who are displaced and the 
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reduction of inter-state wars deserves closer scrutiny . The 
potential for aggressive states to receive large in-migrations 
of refugees from countries that have experienced aggres-
sion could act as a deterrent against aggressive behavior in 
the first instance . The political and economic burdens that 
refugees impose upon destination states, at least in the short 
term, may be enough to deter military aggression in some 
cases, presuming a close relationship between departments 
of state such as military- and migration-related departments . 
Certainly, we might have expected the Western-backed wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq to have received weaker support 
in America and the United Kingdom if these countries had 
expected to accommodate the majority of displaced persons 
created in these conflicts . For aggressive states who share 
land borders with countries they are considering invad-
ing, the likely consequences of war may very well prompt 
them to reconsider military action in a climate of reduced or 
absent border controls . No Borders in this case promises to 
force aggressive states to carry an increasing proportion of 
the responsibility for their actions, although this of course 
would rely upon the specific type of No Borders regime in 
place, the cost of reneging on a No Borders agreement, and 
the specific political preferences and constitutional config-
urations of the states that were party to it .
Under peaceful conditions, the argument for No Borders 
can be further strengthened by recourse to international 
democratic theory . It has long been recognized that, despite 
the claims of democracy to represent voters equally in terms 
of political influence, the fact that some voters are confined 
to a determination of the outcome of elections in relatively 
powerless, debt-laden, economically dependent states ren-
ders their votes incomparable in influence to those cast 
by, say, Americans or Australians . No Borders promises 
to dispense with the inequitable compartmentalization of 
democracy into incomparable national units and would 
facilitate moves towards the equalization of the value and 
influence of votes cast around the world . The democratic fic-
tion that votes are equal in value wherever they are cast, that 
is implicit in many arguments for democratization,54 would 
be directly addressed by the potential for voters to move 
to those jurisdictions within which they would command 
most influence . One critique of this line of argument, how-
ever, is that it implicitly accepts the continued legitimacy of 
states as administrative and authoritative units, while some 
in the No Borders lobby would reject this legitimacy .
Challenges Facing the No Borders Campaign
The notion of No Borders therefore has real appeal . A uto-
pian world that is devoid of state-imposed limits upon move-
ment would be radically democratic . The No Borders cam-
paign promises to invade privileged spaces and deliver many 
migrants from the positions of risk and marginality that they 
commonly occupy . Yet there are some real tensions between 
specific versions of No Borders positions . In particular, from 
a Left-wing perspective, arguments that support liberal bor-
ders have to be treated with some caution because the capital-
ist market economy also benefits from a lack of intervention . 
The concern for Left-wing advocates of No Borders, who 
would recognize all of the above advantages, must be that 
a No Borders policy could also potentially expose the inter-
national working class to the whims of the market (although 
this must be set against the potential to challenge capitalism 
through movement, which justifies many Left-wing argu-
ments in favour of No Borders) . The easiest way to make this 
point clear is to critique some of the arguments made for No 
Borders from a liberal perspective .
One of the most persistent arguments given by conserva-
tives in relation to No Borders is that international mobil-
ity does not serve the national interest . Either by depriving 
incumbent nationals of their jobs, reducing wages, or put-
ting pressure upon domestic welfare systems, this notion 
is deeply persistent . There is a grave danger, however, in 
refuting this myth . It invites us to enter into a debate about 
the worth of the foreigner in domestic, nationalistic terms . 
Riley55 follows in the footsteps of a range of liberal com-
mentators when he falls foul of this temptation in his book, 
Let Them In: The Case for Open Borders, which is intended to 
refute the same sorts of conservative myths that were char-
acterized in the first section of this paper . In attempting to 
show that migrants are useful, Riley adopts arguments and 
language that are in danger of ratifying the exploitation of 
low-skilled migrant populations . In a section of his book 
entitled “Staying Competitive,” Riley writes that:
The strong demand for low-skilled migrant labor is the result of 
more and more U .S . natives earning high school degrees, which 
is a good thing . It means more Americans are becoming more 
productive . But it doesn’t follow that the jobs overqualified U .S . 
natives spurn are now obsolete . Lower-skilled workers, let’s 
remember, tend to manufacture our goods, build our homes, 
harvest our crops, prepare our food, care for our elderly . They 
are nannies and janitors and truck drivers and chambermaids . 
Just because fewer parents are pushing their children toward the 
building trades doesn’t mean that the United States has no use for 
stucco masons .56
Riley’s arguments appear to recognize and accept that 
some part of migrant populations will do the work that 
many Americans do not want to do and are overqualified 
to perform . Evidence from a number of studies shows that 
migrants from developing countries are routinely under-
employed, however, and often do not use the skills that they 
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have acquired in their home countries, often because their 
qualifications are not recognized in their new country .57 
This means that new migrants are often no more suited to 
being “chambermaids” than established populations, but 
the fact that they have recently migrated acts to downgrade 
their skills (not because they lose skills as a result of the 
process of migration, but simply because they are seen as 
“foreign”) constituting a mechanism that facilitates down-
ward class mobility . The reason for letting migrants in, for 
Riley, is that they will then be able to service the needs and 
demands of the incumbent American population . In other 
words, free mobility will allow Americans to reproduce and 
shore up existing class hierarchies, with new migrants at the 
bottom of the pecking order .
While it is relatively straightforward to demonstrate 
that, in fact, foreigners are instrumental and construct-
ive to Western society from the perspective of filling jobs 
and positions that Westerners do not want to perform, this 
demonstration reproduces and deploys the implicit assump-
tion that it is acceptable to base one’s attitude to “foreign-
ers” on the gains that they offer . In another section of his 
book, entitled “America’s Hardest Workers,” Riley outlines 
the case for letting in foreigners who appear to want to work 
longer and harder than average Americans, demonstrating 
that participation rates among recent migrants are higher 
than for most Americans and that unemployment rates are, 
on average, lower . Without mentioning the possibility that 
the low wages they may be receiving might be provoking the 
apparent keenness of migrant populations to work as hard 
as they do, Riley recommends that America takes what it 
is given and accepts these hard workers for the hours and 
dedication that they offer . In so doing, Riley countenances a 
different expectation of native and foreign workers that, per-
versely, reproduces differences between them . Foreigners 
are welcomed into receiving communities conditionally, on 
the basis of their continuing over-performance and labour 
market subordination .
Perhaps the worst consequence of an instrumental atti-
tude towards migrants concerns the legitimation of the 
exploitation of people moving from the “developing world,” 
particularly those with professional expertise . With a 
high number of Western democratic countries facing far-
reaching demographic changes, the developed world is in 
drastic need of imported expertise in a range of areas from 
medicine to the legal profession . What better place to look 
than the international market, which will allow developed 
countries to cherry-pick the finest international talent that 
the developing world has to offer, despite the attempts by 
numerous developing world governments to repatriate their 
most skilled graduates with relocation conditions packages, 
advertising campaigns, financial incentives, and a range of 
accompanying “diaspora strategies”?58 In the face of short-
ages in key workers, the arguments for border liberalisation 
take on a particularly nationalistic tone:
China is graduating four times as many engineers from college as 
the United States … [T]he upshot … is that Mumbai and Beijing—
often by way of MIT and Stanford—are currently producing a 
good amount of the talent that Bill Gates needs to keep Microsoft 
competitive . Migration policies that limit industry’s access to the 
talent become ever more risky as the marketplace becomes ever 
more global . If we want American innovators and entrepreneurs 
to continue enhancing America’s wealth and productivity … bet-
ter to let Apple and Google and eBay make their own personnel 
decisions without interference from [migration restrictionists] .59
Here, the vision of the migrant as a means to an end, that 
of American wealth creation, becomes strikingly apparent . 
International mobility is framed here as a strategy to disallow 
the migration of value-producing industry abroad, despite 
the comparative advantage of foreign countries . By propa-
gating labour mobility, competitive industry need not locate 
in those countries that are producing competitive workers, 
thereby guaranteeing that America remains rich in world-
dominating industry despite its loss of competitiveness .
As Honig60 argues, agonizing about the usefulness or 
otherwise of the foreigner is central to the discursive mech-
anisms that allow recipient societies to define themselves as 
different from foreigners and in opposition to them, even 
allowing for sympathy towards them .61 The very debate 
about whether or not to welcome migrants has the effect of 
defining “our” interests and producing “us” as a group that 
can legitimately determine entry and exit . Demonstrating 
this effect, Riley concludes his book in terms that are overtly 
couched in terms that emphasize the instrumental gains 
that migrants offer to America’s economy and Americans’ 
lifestyle .
On the whole, migrants are an asset to America, not a liability . We 
benefit from the labor, they benefit from the jobs . Our laws should 
acknowledge and reflect this reality, not deny it . Let them in … . 
We still have much more to gain than to lose from people who 
come here to seek a better life .62
With rhetoric such as this, arguments for looser migra-
tion controls should certainly not be confused with an 
attitude that welcomes “the foreigner” unconditionally, 
or seeks to share with “the foreigner” a similar standard 
of living or status to the incumbent population .63 There 
is far less emphasis on what migrants have to gain and 
to lose in accounts such as Riley’s than there is on what 
recipient states and incumbent Western populations may 
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experience . For this reason, some myths circulated in con-
servative texts concerning the potential negative implica-
tions of No Borders are dangerous not only from the point 
of view of their prima facie inaccuracy, but also because 
they seek to engage critics on a discursive terrain that 
takes for granted the ethical license to discuss foreigners 
in instrumental terms .
A second difficulty with arguments for looser border con-
trols that again draws not upon conservative, Right-wing 
arguments but upon a concern for would-be migrants them-
selves is the common assumption that mobility is intrinsic-
ally desirable or pleasurable . Large literatures have begun 
to emerge on a variety of different aspects of mobility .64 
Throughout these studies, however, the common tendency 
is to see movement as a good thing that is worth defending . 
In contrast fixity, mobility’s opposite, is generally associ-
ated with exploitation and, at the extreme, a lack of freedom 
and human rights . The right to free movement has been 
discussed by a variety of authors, and, through these dis-
cussions, mobility itself is lauded as a valuable attribute of 
human experience .
Yet throughout history, long-distance mobility has often 
been costly, regrettable, and undertaken more frequently by 
the marginalized and exploited . In terms of cost, not only 
does long distance movement impose travel costs, but it also 
imposes psychological costs that deprive individuals and 
families of the stability that many desire, especially in the 
case of the frequent and repeated movement associated with 
transnationalism such as seasonal migration, international 
commuting, and the cyclical migration that environmental 
events can give rise to .65 Through his examination of the 
middle-class experience of repeated mobility, Sennett66 
outlines the features of a stable, fixed life that are foregone 
by constantly moving around, including a community that 
extends further than the internet and is capable of consti-
tuting a long-term witness to one’s life . While the dangers 
of overstating the value of communities are well docu-
mented,67 Favell68 similarly reveals the decreasing returns 
to continued mobility that skilled, mobile European work-
ers routinely experience . Discussing the experiences of tele-
communications workers in London, whose lives are punc-
tuated by almost constant migration and movement, Favell 
identifies the weightlessness that these workers often experi-
ence, the difficulty they have in stopping being mobile when 
family circumstances or life-cycle events intervene, the 
uncertainty that regular movement introduces to their lives, 
and the feeling of disaffection that accompanies frequent 
movement .
Favell concludes that “The social theorists of mobility 
have it wrong . There are human limits to flexibility, move-
ment, and transience … Ultra-mobility is not a stable 
long-term option for real people  … .”69 While working-
class people have generally not experienced this degree of 
mobility, there is nothing to suggest that their experience 
of it would be any different; indeed we might expect it to 
be all the more disorientating without the financial means 
to return home if required . In recognition of the psycho-
logical costs of movement, the UN posits that, unless pro-
voked by poverty or the fear of violence, volitional mobil-
ity can be expected to be more the exception than the rule, 
underscoring the common human desire to remain fixed 
and settled wherever possible . Hence, while migration is 
not always crisis ridden70 and sedentarist ways of thinking 
are often obfuscatory,71 the UNHCR represents the major-
ity view when it posits that “Unless he [sic] seeks adventure 
or just wishes to see the world, a person would not normally 
abandon his home and country without some compelling 
reason .”72
For Habermas and Ben-Habib, the paradox of the valor-
ization of mobility is precisely in its implicit, simultaneous 
referencing of fixity and stability . “The new value placed on 
the transitory, the elusive and the ephemeral,” they write, 
“discloses a longing for an undefiled, immaculate and stable 
present .”73 In the light of both the economic and psycho-
logical costs of mobility, then, the routine association of 
mobility with freedom is alarming (although this is not the 
same as claiming a right to mobility) . This is especially the 
case given that the mobility of the working classes so clearly 
serves the interests of organized capitalism, notwithstand-
ing the fact that their immobility does the same . Given a 
global mismatch between labour skills and productive 
industry, the work of increasing human mobility brings 
about a direct transference of the costs of matching these 
two elements from the corporate to the realm of house-
holds, families, and individuals . That such a consequence 
should be accompanied by assertions of the fundamental 
links between human rights and human mobility leads us 
to question whose human rights these might be . As Žižek74 
outlines in his article entitled “Against Human Rights,” the 
work of fundamental human rights assertions is often par-
tial and reflective of the interpretations of the acceptable 
and legitimate humanism of the dominant classes . These 
assertions are always in the name of supposedly universal 
values and truths .75 In this light, the disturbing ability of 
capitalism to produce the ideologies that will facilitate its 
own continued expansion have been noted . David Harvey, 
for example, discusses the ability of the logic of capital to 
bring about “cultural, political, legal and ideological values 
and institutions .”76 In the case of human mobility, the fact 
that the working classes have often been the ones to relocate 
in order to fulfill the spatial demands of industry should 
alert us to the possibility that the present liberal consensus 
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surrounding the desirability of free movement may actually 
ideologically facilitate exploitation .
A further difficulty confronting the No Borders concept 
is that states are often objectified when calling for looser 
border controls . It is as if strict borders are the result of state 
intentions alone, implying that states have both the license 
and ability to repeal them . In fact, while border policies and 
migration laws are certainly enabled by states, they are gen-
erally reflective of deeper social causes that prompt states to 
implement and pursue such policies . As MacKinnon77 has 
argued in a different context, the law is best seen not as a 
cause of social inequality but as an effect of social attitudes . 
From this perspective, a focus upon border control policies 
risks diverting attention away from the generic social xeno-
phobia, racism, and hostility towards migrants that is still 
common in Western democracies, as various studies of the 
British printed tabloid press indicate .78 The tendency of No 
Borders advocates to request that states repeal border con-
trols has the consequence of overestimating the agency of 
state actors in the process of migration policy and law for-
mation . Perversely, then, the call for No Borders risks state 
centrism even as it appeals for state withdrawal .
A final difficulty with arguments in favour of liberal 
borders is, again perversely, its Western centrism . Calls for 
No Borders imply that Western countries are in some way 
more desirable locations than developing countries and, by 
wanting to migrate, migrants themselves confirm this sus-
picion . The first question that should be asked, therefore, is 
why these differences in desirability exist . Most answers 
would point towards the wars, famine, and poverty that 
often plague developing countries . The difficulty from the 
perspective of No Borders, then, is twofold . Firstly, there is 
a risk that by opening borders the symptoms of these dif-
ficulties are treated, but not the causes . Human migration 
away from war and poverty is perfectly understandable, and 
yet to facilitate it is not to tackle its root causes—which a 
Left-wing approach would identify as the mode of produc-
tion and the material inequality between classes . Secondly, 
by opening borders there is a risk that the West may be 
assuaged from any further responsibility for those trapped 
in poverty or in war-torn areas . Migration in this sense 
could be seen as yet another spatial “fix” that allows the 
basic exploitative mechanisms of capitalism to continue to 
operate by releasing political and economic pressure within 
the system in innovative ways . Moreover, as Van Hear dem-
onstrates, it is very often only the most educated, innova-
tive, and well-connected individuals who have the social 
and economic resources to migrate away from destitute or 
violent places .79 For those without these means, No Borders 
would simply exacerbate the brain drain and out-migration 
of able and educated people from their areas of the world 
and the remittances that they are, admittedly, likely to send 
home would be unlikely to compensate for their presence 
in the long term . This returns us to a concern for class: 
Mobility is not a panacea and long-distance, cross-border 
migration with status is, in fact, only open to a relatively 
small section of the population . The inherent inequality of 
mobility itself means that to liberalize borders may be to 
introduce yet another mechanism of injustice that divides 
rich from poor . As is typical of policies that are described 
with the label “liberalism,” the actual freedom that such 
policies deliver to those that experience them is often con-
tingent and partial .
Conclusion
Where does this leave Left-wing intellectualism in rela-
tion to the No Borders debate? It may be argued, from a 
pragmatic perspective, that it does not matter whether 
No Borders are achieved as a result of instrumental, eth-
ical, or Left-wing arguments . If the upshot of these points 
of view is the same, then perhaps the ends are worth the 
means? While this argument may carry some weight in 
the short term, historical experience in Europe suggests 
that the status of migrants who have been accepted purely 
for instrumental reasons by destination countries tends to 
be lower, with certain migrants experiencing heightened 
degrees of social segregation and racism . What is more, 
when these economically expedient migrants become ill, 
when they have dependents, or when they want to receive an 
education, the instrumental view of migrants is in danger 
of countenancing limitations of access to the services they 
require . By not viewing migrants holistically, as social and 
cultural agents with familial and historical ties and also as 
economic agents, and thereby by not admitting the respon-
sibilities that go hand in hand with allowing migration into 
a country, many European countries which have attempted 
to implement economically driven temporary admissions 
programs have merely succeeded in exacerbating social 
tensions .80 Any argument that emphasizes the similarity 
between economic, ethical, and Left-wing reasons to allow 
No Borders may be short-sighted by not anticipating what 
will happen when either migrants cease to be economic-
ally advantageous to destination countries but nevertheless 
seek to remain, or when economic conditions worsen and 
migrants begin to occupy employment opportunities that 
incumbents also desire .
For these reasons, this paper has argued that the discur-
sive position from which No Borders are advocated mat-
ters . If our objective in arguing for No Borders is to secure 
the long-term, unconditional access of migrants to receiv-
ing countries then it is imperative to attend to the specific 
reasons given for No Borders advocacy . Can we therefore 
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conceive of a Left-wing position that avoids the pitfalls both 
of Right-wing conservatism and of free-market liberalism, 
and that also achieves support for a No Borders position? 
I would suggest that it is both necessary and possible to 
counteract Right-wing conservatism and their tendency to 
conflate Left-wing and liberal positions, by supporting No 
Borders whilst also not relying upon the economic expedi-
ency of migration to middle-class Western interests . The fol-
lowing four suggestions would begin to characterize such a 
Left-wing No Borders approach:
•	 Valuing principle or ideology over economic or polit-
ical gain, which may mean valuing means over ends 
and abstaining from making arguments in favour of 
No Borders that draw on modes of thought that are 
inconsistent with Left-wing ideology . Specifically, just 
because freer migration would enrich receiving coun-
tries and their citizens is not a good enough reason to 
argue for freer migration, because this view implicitly 
takes the view that it is acceptable to base decisions 
about migration on the gains available to middle-class 
and Western interests .
•	 Maintaining an awareness of the workings of capital-
ism and the risks of supporting or facilitating it . A Left-
wing approach would be cognizant of the potential for 
both immobility and mobility to serve the interests 
of capital and the capitalist class . An approach that is 
context-specific and avoids over-generalization about 
the pros or cons of mobility would therefore be appro-
priate . On this logic, No Borders arguments would be 
mobilized on the condition that they were commen-
surate with anti-statism and anti-capitalism .
•	 Valuing people equally regardless of where they are 
born or reside, and remaining radically committed to 
supporting policies that confront the system of nation-
states that threatens this equality . An insistence on this 
point would avoid the risk that arguments for mobility 
and freer borders are made with the objective of mov-
ing people with lower status into positions from which 
they can serve the needs and meet the demands of 
people with higher status more easily, which is clearly 
the risk that some liberal arguments run .
•	 Being specific in discourse and discussion about the 
distinctions between approaches . There needs to be 
greater awareness on the Left of the strategies, inten-
tions, and effects of conservative Right-wing commen-
tators’ discourses, which conflate liberal and Left-wing 
stances . This conflation introduces confusion that is 
all the more pervasive because it appears to offer both 
liberals and those on the Left a ready ally in the fight 
for freer borders . But the very different rationales these 
two schools put forward to justify freer borders must 
mean that the Left, at least, should seek to distance 
itself from liberal arguments, even as they support the 
same outcomes .
While this list is by no means exhaustive, it may go some 
way to helping No Borders advocates and Left-wing intellec-
tuals determine the terms of the relationship they share .
This paper has argued for a richer perspective on the No 
Borders issue by suggesting that there are in fact three pos-
itions relating to the No Borders issue and not two (as Right-
wing conservatives might claim) . Although conservative 
commentators would have us believe that liberalism and 
Left-wing policies are comparable, these two arguments in 
favour of No Borders are in fact quite distinct . In particular, 
the tendency for liberal commentators to see migrants in 
instrumental terms introduces a degree of instrumental-
ism, nationalism, and Western-centrism about which Left-
wing scholars with a concern for the international working 
classes would do well to be wary . More broadly, then, the 
binary dichotomies between Left and Right, liberal and 
illiberal, open and closed, as with an increasing number of 
political issues, insufficiently captures the variety of claims 
made around No Borders policies .
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